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ToRTs-THE DrscRETIONARY FUNCTION ExcEPTION IN THE FEDToRT CLAIMS AcT-The doctrine of the immunity of the sovereign in tort has long been the subject of attack by statesmen and
legal writers.1 In response to these attacks and with a view to eliminating the unjust, expensiv~, and time-consuming method of settling
tort claims against the federal government by the private bill method,2
Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946.3 The act contained a number of exceptions,4 the most important of which preserved
the immunity doctrine as to any claim arising out of a "discretionary
function" of government.5 A recent decision of the United States
Supreme Court illustrates the problems presented to the tort claimant
by the exception as well as the confusion which has characterized judicial attempts to define it. Dalehite 11. United States6 was a test case
representing some three hundred separate claims arising out of the
disastrous explosions in the harbor of Texas City, Texas in April 1947. 7
The substance giving rise to the explosions was a government-manufactured fertilizer, FGAN, cargoes of which had been loaded on French
vessels preparatory for shipment abroad. The decision to manufacture

ERAL

1 Repko, "American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of Municipal Tort Liability,"
9 LAw AND CoNTEM. P.aoB. 214 (1942). For a history of the gradual erosion of government immunity in tort, see Yankwich, "Problems Under the Federal Tort Claims Act," 9
F.R.D. 143 (1949); H. Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and
H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 37-42 (1942).
2 A summary of congressional criticism of the private bill procedure is contained in
H. Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th
Cong., 2d sess., pp. 49-55 (1942). For a description of the procedure, see Holtzoff, ''The
Handling of Tort Claims Against the Federal Government," 9 LAw AND CoNTEM, P.aoB.
311 at 323-325 (1942).
3 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §§1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 24ll,
2412, 2671-2680. Sec. I346(b) provides that " ••• the district courts ••• shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages
• • • for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope
of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred."
4 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §2680.
5 "The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to(a) Any claim •.• based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or employee of
the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V,
1952) §2680. A somewhat comparable provision may be found in the "prerogative of the
crown" exception of the British Crown Proceedings Act, 10-ll Geo. VI, c. 44 (1947).
See Barnes, "The Crown Proceedings Act, 1947," 26 CAN. B. Rnv. 387 (1948); Street,.
"Tort Liability of the State: the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Crown Proceedings Act,"
47 MicH. L. Rnv. 341 (1949).
o 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956 (1953).
7 The explosions and the fires which followed destroyed much of the city, killed more
than 560 persons and injured over 3,000. See N.Y. TIMES, April 17, 1947, §1, p. 1:8.
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FGAN for overseas use was made at the cabinet level8 and was designed
to implement the government policy of increasing food production in
war-devastated countries. Responsibility for carrying out the program
was delegated to the Army's Chief of Ordnance, and he in turn appointed the Field Director of Ammunition Plants as general administrator of the program. The office of the latter official drafted specifications for manufacture. The petitioner alleged negligence on the part
of government employees in the original formulation of the program,
in the manufacture of the FGAN, in the shipment of the product to
a congested area without adequate warning of its explosive potentialities, in the failure to police the loading operations, and in the failure
to fight the fire that resulted from the explosion.9 The district court's
judgment for the petitioner was reversed by the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit,1° and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.11 In a
four-to-three decision12 the Court found the alleged negligent acts and
omissions to be "discretionary functions" and therefore within the
exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity. While finding the acts
and omissions involved in the case before it to be matters undertaken
at the "planning" rather than the "operational" level, the majority did
not suggest a clear test for so classifying other activities of government.
It was simply held that the exception included not only the "initiation"
of programs but also the establishing of "plans, schedules, and operations."13
The lower federal courts have been in sharp disagreement as to
the proper method of applying the discretionary function exception.14
They have generally followed an ad hoc approach and have refrained
from formulating a test for applying the exception uniformly.11' The
s The plan was suggested by the Under-Secretary of War, order~d into operation by
the Director of the Office of War Mobilization, and approved by the cabinet. Funds were
allocated to the project by the War Department, and a direct appropriation for relief in
occupied areas was made the following year by Congress.
9 A claim that the United States was liable without fault by virtue of its engaging
in an "extra hazardous activity" was rejected by the Court. It has been suggested that
government should assume the liability of an insurer in projects involving extreme risk.
See, e.g., Blachly and Oatman, "Approaches to Governmental Liability in Tort: A Comparative Survey," 9 I.Aw AND CoNTEM. PnoB. 181 at 213 (1942). France has adopted this
view. Id. at 205-211. Cf. Evans v. Berry, 262 N.Y. 61, 186 N.E. 203 (1933).
10 In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, (5th Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 771.
11 Dalehite v. United States, 344 U.S. 873, 73 S.Ct. 166 (1952).
12 Justices Jackson, Black and Frankfurter dissented. Justices Douglas and Clark did
not participate in the case.
1a Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 at 35-36, 73 S.Ct. 956 (1953).
14 See cases collected in 19 A.L.R. (2d) 845 (1951); 66 HARv. L. R.Ev. 488 (1953).
15 For an expression of the view that a vague standard is desirable in this :field, see
Street, "Tort Liability of the State: the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Crown Proceedings
Act," 47 MrCH. L. R.Ev. 341 at 364-368 (1949).
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resulting uncertainty necessarily undermines the effectiveness of the
remedy provided by the act. The likelihood of lengthy litigation,
the outcome of which may depend upon the personal approach of
a particular judge, and the prospect of eventually having to rely
upon the old private hill procedure are not likely to encourage the
vigorous prosecution of just claims against the government.16 It becomes important therefore to re-examine the various tests that have
been suggested by courts and legal writers for applying the exception and to determine which would best effectuate the purposes
of the lawmakers.

I.
Judgment.

Possible Tests for Applying the Exception
A simple definition of discretion would be "judgment."

It could he said that whenever a person has the "power to do or to

refrain from doing a certain thing,"17 he has discretion. Such a
definition would of course encompass almost every activity engaged
in by government employees and would make the Tort Claims Act
itself meaningless.18
Reasonable or honest judgment. Some courts have attempted to
temper the effects of such a literal definition of "discretion" by
implying the limitations of reason, good faith, and the law.19 Such
limitations have little utility, however, because the exception includes
not only acts of discretion, hut also acts involving the "abuse of discretion."20
Expert judgment. The majority opinion in the Dalehite case
refers to the acts involved as pertaining to matters that required the
use of "expert judgment."21 It is to he hoped that this statement is
not intended as a test for determining when an act is discretionary.
16 Shortly after the decision in the Dalehite case, the House Committee on the Judiciary
was authorized to investigate the merits of the claims arising out of the Texas City disaster.
H. Res. 296, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953). The action was taken to avoid individual consideration of approximately one thousand private bills, as estimated by Representative
Thompson of Texas. 99 CoNG, RBc. 10187-10188 (July 27, 1953). It is not pleasant to
note that it took the disaster victims over six years merely to discover their remedy.
17 BLAcx, LAw DICTIONARY, 4th ed., 553 (1951).
1s 66 HARv. L. RBv. 488 (1953).
10 12 Wonns .AND PHRASES 587-602 (1940).
20 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §2680. The term "abuse of discretion" is a confusing
one. If there are no limits at all to an official's discretion, his discretion can never be abused.
However, if there are limits, and the official goes beyond them, it might be said that he is
not really abusing his discretion since he is no longer exercising discretion. Perhaps the
term is meaningful only if acts in the "abuse of discretion" are thought of as acts ''beyond
discretion.''
21 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 at 40, 73 S.Ct. 956 (1953).
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Few federal employees may be said to lack a degree of expertness in
their fields, be they generals, typists, tank drivers, pilots, physicians,
or air control tower operators, but the lower federal courts have often
found liability in cases involving such employees. 22 There is an
element of unreality in the view that "the experts can do no wrong,"
and there is nothing in the Tort Claims Act to indicate a congressional intent to disclaim liability for the wrongful acts of experts or
to assume liability for the wrongful acts of non-experts when they
are engaged in activities of a true policy-making character.

Personal liability of the employee. It has been suggested that
Congress intended to use the word "discretionary" in the Federal Tort
Claims Act in the same sense in which the term has been used in
other contexts,23 such as actions for damages or mandamus against
' government employees personally. Such an approach would make
the liability of the United States derivative from the liability of an
employee. While this view has been expressed by some courts,24 it
appears founded upon the erroneous notion that the Tort Claims Act
was designed to protect government employees rather than the victims
of their wrongful acts. 25 Moreover, there is little relation between
what might be proper policy in mandamus actions, or in damage suits
against individual employees, and the policy question involved in a
tort action against the government. In any event, such a test simply
postpones and does not answer the problem, since judicial definitions
of "discretion" in these contexts have been hopelessly confusing.26
Language of the statutory authority. If the statute under which
the official acts contains words of discretion, it might be considered
evidence of an intent to exclude his actions from review by the
courts in a damage action. 27 It does not follow, however, that whenever Congress uses such words to define the' official's place in the
22 See, e.g., Parcell v. United States, (D.C. W.Va. 1951) 104 F. Supp. 110; Gilroy
v. United States, (D.C. D.C. 1953) 112 F. Supp. 664; Costley v. United States, (5th Cir.
1950) 181 F. (2d) 723; Wilscam v. United States, (D.C. Hawaii 1948) 76 F. Supp. 581.
23 See, e.g., Coates v. United States, (8th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 816.
24Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153 (1950); Smart v. United States,
(D.C. Okla. 1953) 111 F. Supp. 907; Kendrick v. United States, (D.C. Ala. 1949) 82 F.
Supp. 430.
25 It is at least doubtful whether even the principle of respondeat superior is founded
upon the principle of derivative liability. Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249
N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928); SEAVEY, STUDIES IN AGENCY 1-27 (1949).
26 Patterson, "Ministerial and Discretionary Official Acts," 20 MICH. L. REv. 848
(1922).
27 Denny v. United States, (5th Cir. 1948) 171 F. (2d) 365; Boyce v. United States,
(D.C. Iowa 1950) 93 F. Supp. 866.
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administrative structure, it is intending to withdraw his actions from
the coverage of the Tort Claims Act. The policy considerations involved in these two legislative problems are entirely different, and
it would not be strange if Congress was to use such a vague term as
"discretion" to mean different things in different laws. Such a test,
moreover, would be helpful only in cases involving a selected group
of public officials. The great mass of government employees do not
function under any direct statutory authority.
Position of the employee. In determining whether a discretionary
function is involved in an action against an individual employee, the
courts customarily look to the act performed rather than to the position of the employee performing it.28 Despite this general rule,
there has been a tendency in some cases to give the official position
of the employee considerable weight in applying the discretionary
function exception.29 It would seem that reliance should be placed
upon the employee's rank only when necessary for the determination
of the issue of the existence of a discretionary function. At the
most, the employee's position should be a mere evidentiary factor
and not an independent test for applying the exception.
Governmental v. proprietary function. In cases involving the
issue of municipal tort liability, the general practice has been to find
liability in cases involving traditional functions of government and
to deny liability in cases where the government is acting as a private
person.30 This is an arbitrary doctrine and appears to have been
formulated as a convenient loophole in the sovereign immunity doctrine rather than as an instrument of justice in all cases. With the
increasing acceptance of the broad scope of governmental activity in
modern times, the "governmental-proprietary" distinction has become
almost meaningless. The distinction, although long known to the
28 43 AM.. JUR., Public Officers §372 (1942).
20 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 at 40, 73 S.Ct. 956 (1953); Boyce v.
United States, (D.C. Iowa 1950) 93 F. Supp. 866; Cromelin v. United States, (5th Cir.
1949) 177 F. (2d) 275, cert. den. 339 U.S. 944, 70 S.Ct. 790 (1949). The latter case
involved a charge of judicial misconduct; the court found it unnecessary to apply the discretionary function exception since judges were held not to be "employees" under the act.
ao 38 AM.. JUR., Municipal Corporations §§571-577 (1941); 120 A.L.R. 1376 (1939).
The minority opinion in the Dalehite case seems to espouse this view. 346 U.S. 15 at 60,
73 S.Ct. 956 (1953). For an example of the harsh application of the doctrine, see Hodges
v. City of Charlotte, 214 N.C. 737, 200 S.E. 889 (1939), where the plaintiff was denied
recovery for injuries suffered when he was hit by a city truck, because the truck driver was
on his way to install a new bulb in a traffic light.
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lawmakers, was apparently rejected by them in the drafting of the
act.31

Initiation v. performance. Many courts have held that while
government is not responsible in tort for programs and policies wrongfully conceived and initiated, it is responsible for wrongful acts in
the carrying out of such projects.32 The Court in the Dalehite case
rejected this distinction.33 In many cases, the manner of the performance of a program may be vital to the program itself. Decisions
made in the carrying out of a project may involve weighty considerations as important as the original decision to embark on the policy.
It is doubtful, therefore, that such a distinction is in harmony with
the purpose of the discretionary function exception.

II.

Suggested Test for Applying the Exception

The preceding tests have their origins in a formalistic or expedient construction of the statutory exception, which gives little
attention to the fundamental purpose of the exception and often
ignores the purpose of the Tort Claims Act. An attempt must be
made to formulate a test which will achieve both the purpose of
the exception and the purpose of the act as a whole. By passing
the Tort Claims Act, Congress clearly intended to provide a more
effective and convenient remedy for the victims of governmental
wrongdoing. To provide a brake on the legislative desire expressed
in the act generally, the discretionary function exception must have
been supported by momentous policy considerations. Congress could
not have intended to destroy the essential fabric of the act by including an exception based upon arbitrary or verbalistic distinctions
or designed merely to preserve the dignity of public officials having
high rank and expert reputation. The primary purpose of the exception appears to be simply a recognition of the long established
doctrine that there should be preserved a reasonable independence
in executive and legislative action in accordance with the spirit of
the separation of powers system.34 This purpose is indicated by the
31 Gottlieb, ''The Federal Tort Claims Act-a Statutory Interpretation," 35 Gso. L.J.
I (1946).
32 Johnston v. District of Columbia, ll8 U.S. 19, 6 S.Ct. 923 (1886); Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, (4th Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 631; Costley v. United States,
(5th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 723. But compare Boyce v. United States, (D.C. Iowa 1950)
93 F. Supp. 866; Mid-Central Fish Co. v. United States, (D.C. Mo. 1953) ll2 F. Supp.
792.
33 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 at 35-36, 73 S.Ct. 956 (1953).
34Jn Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 at 170 (1803), Chief Justice
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nature of the other exceptions in the act:3 11 and by the inclination of
the judiciary to infer something like the discretionary function exception even without express statutory language.36 There must inevitably be some degree of conHict between the general purpose of
the act and the purpose of the exception, but a careful balancing of
. their respective requirements is necessary to the discovery of an
adequate standard of interpretation. To achieve this balance, it is
suggested that two types of governmental activity should be immune
from judicial review through the medium of an action in tort: (a)
original decisions to embark upon general governmental programs and
policies; and (b) subsidiary policy decisions made in the carrying
out of such programs and policies, which are essential to the feasibility
of the general program. But there is no need for preserving this
immunity as to particular functions, whether they be of a policymaking or ministerial nature, which are not essential to the successful
execution of general executive or legislative policy.
The test for determining whether a particular function is "discretionary" might therefore be stated in this manner: must this
particular function be performed at this particular place, at this
particular time, and in this particular manner if the general policy
or program decided upon is to be feasible? If the answer is in the
affirmative, the function is discretionary. Such a test would not
require the courts to determine the wisdom or desirability of basic
policy. It would not invest the courts with virtual power to veto
top-level decisions to undertake certain governmental projects. However, it would require that any such project be undertaken in a
manner which would cause the least possible wrongful injury· to individuals. It would accept Justice Jackson's declaration that "it is
not a tort for government to govern,"37 but it would require that
whatever governing is done be characterized by as high a degree of
care for the safety of private property and person as is consistent with
Marshall made the following comment: "The province of the court is, solely, to decide on
the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform
duties in which they have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are,
by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court."
85 28

U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §2680.
a statement made during hearings on the Tort Claims Bill, Assistant Attorney
General Francis M. Shea expressed the opinion that the exception would be read into the
act by judicial construction if it were not specifically included by Congress. H. Hearings
before the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d sess.,
p. 29 (1942). Similar exceptions have been judicially formulated in New York, Goldstein
v. State, 281 N.Y. 396, 24 N.E. (2d) 97 (1939), and by the federal courts in the T.V.A.
cases. See, e.g., Pacific Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. T.V.A., (D.C. Va. 1950) 89 F. Supp. 978.
8 7 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 at 57, 73 S.Ct. 956 (1953).
8 6 In
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the success of the project. Nearly every governmental activity will
of course react to the detriment of certain individual citizens. But
it should be incumbent on every government official at every level
to minimize such injury as far as possible. Thus, for example, Congress should be free to initiate a federal power project in a given
area, and the wisdom of such a governmental function should not
be attacked through the device of an action in tort. A decision to
change the channel of a river might be vital to the feasibility of
the project and thus should be similarly immune from collateral attack. But a decision to use defective materials in the construction
of the Hood gates, for example, would not be essential to the feasibility of the project and should be grounds for a tort action by one
wrongfully injured by it. Similarly, an executive decision to develop a new type of atomic weapon should not be attacked in a tort
action, and decisions to conduct tests of the new device, being essential to the success of the program, should be likewise immune,
even though the performance of such tests might inevitably cause
injury to certain people. The stockpiling of such weapons in the
center of a metropolitan area, however, would not be necessary for
the success of the program, and should therefore be subject to attack
in a tort action.
This test would allow the determination of legislative and executive policy to be made by those constitutionally responsible for
such decisions. In applying the test, a court would be required
to make a preliminary determination as to whether the function involved consists in the formulation of a general program or whether
it is merely a tool for implementing some general program. Then,
if it found the activity in question to be of the latter type, the court
would be confronted with a question of fact as to the essentiality
of the particular function to the effectuation of the program as a
whole. The application of the test would of course often involve
difficult issues of fact. But difficult fact issues are not novel in our
judicial system and are often a characteristic of ordinary private tort
actions. A fair and objective test that will accomplish the legislative
purpose is worth the price of hard questions for the trier of facts.
Some hint that the Supreme Court has given consideration to
such a test is indicated by the majority opinion in the Dalehite case.38
However, the result in the case does not appear to be in harmony
with this approach. 39 It is to be hoped that future decisions rendered
38 Id.
39 If

at 40, 42.
it had been shown, for example, that shipment of the FGAN could have been

1954]

CoMMBNTS

741

on this issue by the Court will conform to the principle suggested in
the Dalehite case rather than to the actual result reached. The purpose of the discretionary function exception would be thereby preserved, while the remedy provided by the act would suffer a minimum
loss of vitality.
Howard A. Cole, S.Ed.

made safely only by packing the product in heavy metal containers, the cost of which
would have made the entire project unEeasible, the government could have sustained, in
accordance with this proposed test, its decision to pack the FGAN in paper bags. But it
does not appear that it would have been impracticable to have shipped the FGAN in some
safer container. And certainly the failure to give adequate warning oE the explosive nature
of the product was not necessary to the success of the program. In this connection, see
Hernandez v. United States, (D.C. Hawaii 1953) 112 F. Supp. 369, where it was held
a discretionary act to erect a road block, but not a discretionary act to fail to give warning
of its existence.

